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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Performance measurement is becoming an inescapable part of life in the public sector. At pro-
gram level, the Government and Performance Results Act 1993 requires all US federal agencies
to prepare performance plans and report annually on progress towards program goals. Equally
strong mandates exist in Canada, New Zealand and the UK, with similar initiatives, albeit
with less top-down compulsion, in most OECD countries. At organization level, performance
measurement also pervades most areas of delivery.1 In 2002, 43 US States published school
level report card data (Kane and Staiger 2002, Figure 1). In the UK, summary indicators are
published for every secondary school under the Education Acts 1988, 1992. Lastly, even indi-
vidual performance measurement is on the increase. In health care, pressure from insurance
plans and consumer groups has resulted in public disclosure of report card data right down to
individual clinicians.2
Since political enthusiasm is not always a perfect predictor of economic eﬃciency, it
seems natural to ask whether governments and their agencies are designing their performance
measurement (PM) systems correctly. Are the right data being collected? Should performance
be measured at program, organization or individual level? Should performance statistics be
fed back conﬁdentiality to employees or published to all stakeholders? As usual, the answer is:
it depends; in this instance on the impact PM systems have on recruitment and retention, and
on incentives.
To date, the literature has focused almost exclusively on the relationship between PM
systems and incentives.3 This is unfortunate since there are good reasons to believe that
recruitment and retention issues play an important role in the running of public services. In
the UK the Department of Health recently commented that “the biggest constraint in the NHS
today is no longer a shortage of ﬁnancial resources. It is a shortage of human resources”, NHS
Plan (2000, cited in Audit Commission 2002). Recruitment and retention problems have also
been identiﬁed in the US (see, for instance, GAO 2001 and Stinebrickner 2001) as well as in
Canada, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, with crises imminent in Austria, Germany, Norway
and Spain (¨ Aij¨ al¨ a 2001).
1Mannion and Goddard (2000) provide a cross-sector survey of recent developments in the UK. For a com-
parative survey of US and UK organization and team level PMs see Propper and Wilson (2003).
2Schemes similar to New York’s Cardiac Surgery Reporting System - in place since 1989 - now exist in a
variety of US States. In Europe, the closest comparators are the operating room PMs published for the NHS
and hospital level clinical outcome data published by the Scottish Executive (see Mannion and Goddard 2004).
3See, for instance, Dixit’s (2002) discussion of the optimality of ‘low-powered’ incentives in the public sector
or the burgeoning empirical literature that is documenting dysfunctional responses to incentive schemes (e.g.
Courty and Marschke (1997), Heckman (2002)).
2The objective of this paper is to study how PM systems aﬀect the recruitment and
retention of public sector employees. In doing so, we focus on a key characteristic of the public
sector: wage rigidity. Rigidities in public sector pay make it hard for government agencies to
recruit and retain high skill groups but also entail paying rents to low skill groups (see, for
instance, Katz and Krueger 1991, Postel-Vinay and Turon 2005 and the discussion in Section
2). These rents, typically overlooked in policy circles, lie at the heart of our results.
To emphasize the forces other than eﬀort incentives at work, we study the design of PM
systems in the presence of adverse selection rather than moral hazard. In our model, which we
set out more fully in Section 3, a public sector organization competes with the private sector
labor market to hire a worker in each of two periods. The worker derives a non-pecuniary
payoﬀ from working in the public sector which is known to all. His productivity in both sectors
is determined solely by his innate ability which is unknown to all. At the beginning of each
period the market oﬀers the worker a wage equal to its expectation of his productivity. If it
hires him, his performance is publicly available. In contrast, the public sector organization is
compelled to be more rigid, having to ﬁx its pay and PM system up-front. If it chooses to be
transparent the market learns the worker’s performance, if it chooses to be opaque the market
learns nothing.
As we show in Section 4, the choice of PM system aﬀects the cost of recruitment and
retention. A transparent public sector organization can recruit at the market’s entry-level oﬀer
(net of the non-pecuniary pay oﬀ) because the worker’s initial sector choice has no impact on
his future income. However, a transparent public sector organization will then ﬁnd it costly to
retain a good performer because it must pay the market reward for success (again net of the
non-pecuniary pay oﬀ). An opaque organization diﬀers in that it must pay more to recruit the
worker but less to retain a good performer. Recruiting is more expensive because the worker,
recognizing that ‘going private’ has an option value, demands greater compensation up-front
(what we term the option-value eﬀect). The upside is that a good performer can then be
retained at no extra cost (the outside-oﬀer eﬀect) which, in turn, reduces the expected transfer
of rent. The public sector organization therefore faces the choice between (i) recruiting only in
the second period, (ii) being transparent, recruiting the worker cheaply in the ﬁrst period but
losing him if he is successful and (iii) being opaque, compensating for the option-value eﬀect
and retaining with certainty.
We show that transparency is never optimal. Under transparency no rent is paid in
period 1 but a poor performer is retained on the same wage in period 2. Under opaqueness the
premium paid in period 1 nets out with the saving made on a good performer, leaving just the
rent paid to a poor performer. Notice that the advantage of transparency is that it minimizes
rent transfers, while the advantage of opaqueness is that it maximizes retention and hence
the gain from non-pecuniary motivation. Transparency is never optimal because, whenever
the public sector organization is willing to recruit in period 1 rather than 2, the worker’s
3non-pecuniary pay oﬀ is suﬃciently high to ensure that the motivation eﬀect dominates.
In Section 5 we extend the model in a number of directions. We ﬁrst allow the public
sector organization to adopt traditional public sector personnel policies such as service based
pay (aka a retention bonus in the second period) and ports of entry (aka a commitment not to
recruit in the second period). The main conclusion from the benchmark model is not altered.
Transparency is never optimal in the presence of a port of entry or a small service bonus,
although it can be weakly optimal if the service bonus is suﬃciently high. More importantly,
both policies, while increasingly maligned by government, can be rationalized as an optimal
response to pay rigidity because they mitigate the transfer of rent to poor performers.
In Section 5 we also allow the market to ‘pay for performance’. In this case, if the
organization is not transparent but the worker observes his performance, the market will treat
willingness to separate from the public sector as a sign of success. This inference drives up
the market’s second period wage and kills the outside oﬀer eﬀect. As we discuss in Section 6,
the consequence is that optimal PM policies are likely to vary across government agencies. In
“craft” organizations (Wilson 1989), where workers are aware of their own performance even in
an absence of formal performance monitoring, managers may well ﬁnd it optimal to introduce
and then publish formal PMs. In other organizations recruitment and retention considerations
will typically be best served by an opaque arrangement.
Related Literature Our approach relates to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst strand -
the adverse selection in labor markets literature - focuses on equilibrium wage proﬁles, holding
the information structure constant.4 The basic idea, ﬁrst explored by Greenwald (1986), is
that current employers will seek to prevent turnover of their better workers and hence prompt
raiders to infer that job separations are disproportionately drawn from the low end of the
productivity distribution. The resulting ‘lemons’ problem reduces turnover and shifts wages
towards the entry-level market, with entry-level employers oﬀering more than unconditional
expected productivity as they compete to place each worker in a captive situation. Greenwald
shows that the adverse selection problem intensiﬁes in the three period version of the model as
workers bear the scars of separation for longer and so have even less incentive to quit. This, in
turn, produces a short-term return to separation as separated workers must be compensated
for the consequences of scarring in period 3.
Our results echo several of Greenwald’s ﬁndings. If our public sector employer fails to
publish performance she must also increase her oﬀer in the entry-level market. The reason
is very diﬀerent however: public sector pay must compensate for the option value eﬀect. In
a three period version of our model workers can also be scarred by the market. However,
measuring but failing to publish performance prompts the market to infer that public sector
4A comprehensive review of this literature is provided by Gibbons (1999, Section 3.4) and is not repeated
here. For a review of the more tangentially related papers in the job-assignments as signalling literature (e.g.
Waldman 1984), see Gibbons (1999, Section 3.2).
4quitters are drawn from the high end of the productivity distribution.5 As a result, in our
inter-sector setting, it is the period 2 public sector stayers rather than quitters that are scarred
which, in turn, necessitates a higher level of public sector pay to secure retention in period 2.
The second strand - the nascent optimal performance disclosure literature - solves simul-
taneously for equilibrium wage proﬁles and information structures. Calzolari and Pavan (2004)
and Koch and Peyrache (2003) assume workers/agents separate exogenously after period 1 and
hence restrict attention to incentive and recruitment issues (interestingly both also ﬁnd that
transparency is rarely optimal). More closely related to our work is Mukherjee (2004) who
extends Greenwald’s analysis by allowing entry-level employers to commit to a disclosure rule
and by giving entry-level employees an eﬀort choice. The central point is that transparency
can be optimal. Immediately publishing performance maximizes the trading surplus in period
2 by removing the winner’s curse eﬀect. This beneﬁts the entry-level employer because the
gain in surplus accrues to worker (by virtue of competition between raiders) and can therefore
be appropriated up-front as a lower entry-level wage. In our setting transparency also enables
the public sector employer to pay a lower entry-level wage - although by eliminating an option-
value, rather than winner’s curse, eﬀect - but is not an optimal public sector PM system (i.e.
in the presence of pay compression) because of the rents paid to poor performers.6
2 E v i d e n c eo fR e l a t i v eP a yC o m p r e s s i o na n dS o r t i n g
Anecdotal evidence of pay inﬂexibility in the public sector is common place (e.g. ¨ Aij¨ al¨ a 2001,
OECD 2002) but is also borne out by the data. The wage gaps presented in Table A1 in
Appendix A show that, across a wide range of countries, the unconditional wage distribution
is indeed more compressed in the public sector than in the private sector. The 10th and 90th
quantile regression estimates collated in Table A2 provide more compelling evidence that it is
pay setting policies - rather than simply characteristics - that diﬀer across sectors. With two
exceptions (poorly educated British men and highly educated German women), the ﬁrst number
in each cell is higher than the second, indicating that the conditional wage distribution is more
compressed in the public sector, both across and within education groups. More importantly,
in many cells, the ﬁrst number is positive and the second negative. This substantiates the claim
that public sector pay is inﬂexible rather than simply ungenerous. To the extent that these are
true premiums and penalties (see Disney and Gosling (1998) for a discussion), a public sector
employee with given characteristics at the 10th percentile of wage distribution would, taken at
5Echoing the ﬁndings of Katz and Krueger (1991), Borjas (2002) and Hoxby and Leigh (2004) described in
Section 2, in our model public sector pay inﬂexibility creates favorable selection into the labor market.
6Blanes i Vidal (2002) focuses on a rather diﬀerent ‘career concerns for experts’ setting but makes a similar
point. Delegating decision-rights (akin to not measuring performance in our or Mukerjee’s setting) restores
symmetry and hence kills the winner’s curse. This beneﬁts the entry-level employer by strengthening career
concern incentives.
5random, lose from a move to the private sector while the converse would be true at the 90th
percentile.
Turning to the implications of pay rigidity, Katz and Krueger (1991) report that, over
the course of early 1980’s, application rates per hire rose for blue-collar US federal jobs but
fell for white-collar federal jobs, the median Math SAT score of new scientists and engineers
at the US Department of Defence (DOD) declined relative to the student population and the
separation rate for DOD scientists and engineers scoring above 650 on the Math SAT was
50% greater than those below that level. Exploiting better data (CPS-ORG ﬁles 1979-2002),
Borjas (2002) estimates the partial eﬀect of relative wage compression on the private sector
wage gap (acting as a proxy for the skill gap) between US public sector quitters and prospective
public sector entrants. Controlling for observable worker characteristics and year eﬀects, Borjas
suggests that the 15% drop in the inter-sector ratio of standard deviations of weekly log income
between 1979-2002 increased the wage gap by about 4%. Hoxby and Leigh (2004) narrow their
focus to education and attempt to apportion the blame for the decline in the aptitude of US
public school teachers between improved job opportunities for females and the compression of
teaching wages due to unionization. Using state labor laws as instruments to isolate wage eﬀects
due to unionization, they suggest that pay compression explains about 80% of the decline of
the share of teachers in the highest aptitude group (SAT scores in the top 5 percentiles).
A variety of explanations for rigidities in public sector pay have been mooted, ranging
from the economic (higher rates of unionization, larger employer size, non-proﬁt status, inelas-
tic/monopsonistic demand for labor) to the political (narrow nationwide pay scales, aﬃrmative
action/minium wage policies, electoral wage cycles) but there have been few rigorous attempts
to pursue the issue. While this leaves the root causes of public sector pay inﬂexibility as an
important open question, its concomitant eﬀects appear clear: pay rigidities make it hard for
the public sector to recruit and retain the best, rather than worst, employees.
3 The Benchmark Model
A public sector employer (she) and a private sector labor market compete to hire a worker
(he) to a series of tasks. Each task takes one period to complete. The worker is productive
for 2 periods and so can complete at most 2 tasks. All tasks either succeed or fail, with the
outcome in period t =1 ,2d e n o t e db yyt ∈ {s,f}. The value of task success is normalized to 1
and the value of failure to 0. The probability of task success in period t is determined solely
by the worker’s innate skill level θ,i . e .P r ( yt = s | θ)=θ for all t =1 ,2. The realization of θ
is unknown to everybody. In the entry-level market all players share the prior belief that the
worker is as likely to be ‘high-skilled’ (θ = θh) as ‘low-skilled’ (θ = θl), where θh >θ l and, to
economize on parameters, we set θh =1− θl.7
7The practical implication of the assumption θh =( 1− θl)i st h a tP r ( yt = s)=P r ( yt = f)=
1
2.
6Each period the worker chooses a sector ct ∈ {g,m} to maximize his (undiscounted)
expected utility. The choice ct = g will be termed going public and the choice ct = m going
private. His per-period payoﬀ to going public in period t is wgt+α, while his per-period payoﬀ
to going private in period t is wmt. The wage oﬀers wgt and wmt are discussed below. The
exogenous parameter α ∈ < is common knowledge and denotes the worker’s non-pecuniary
payoﬀ to working in the public sector relative to the private sector. It will be termed his
intrinsic motivation.
The public sector employer (Pg) moves once at the beginning of the game, committing to
a PM policy and a pay policy to maximize total expected public sector proﬁt (the undiscounted
sum of expected output less wages). For reasons discussed at the end of this Section we focus
on just two PM policies. Pg can either commit to abstain from performance measurement (no
one observes y1) or to measure and publish y1 (everyone observes y1). We will term the former
ap o l i c yo fopaqueness and the latter a policy of transparency. Turning to her pay policy, we
model the rigidities described in Section 2 as follows.
A1 Public sector pay in period t is determined by the formula wgt = γw+(1−γ)(wmt − α).
Pg chooses the ﬁxed component w once, alongside the PM policy, at the beginning of
the game. The weighting term γ ∈ (0,1] is exogenous and parameterizes pay compression.
When γ is equal to 1 public sector pay is constant through time. As γ approaches 0 public
sector pay responds to the market’s outside oﬀer to leave the worker indiﬀerent between sectors.
Increments in pay for length of service are considered in Section 5.1.
A2 The worker cannot be ﬁred from, or denied entry to, the public sector in any period.
Pg employs the worker whenever he is willing to work for a wage of wgt. The assumption
that the worker cannot be ﬁred is consistent with the low public sector dismissal rates reported
by Wilson (1989) and Postel-Vinay and Turon (2005) and will be maintained throughout.8 The
assumption that the worker cannot be denied entry is necessary to generate the transitions from
the private sector documented by both Katz and Krueger (1991) and Postel-Vinay and Turon
(2005). For intermediate values of w, a worker who has failed in the private sector in period
1 will switch to the public sector in period 2. This assumption is potentially contentious,
however, and will be relaxed in Section 5.2 where we allow Pg to operate a ‘port of entry’ (or
equivalently deny entry to low skill groups).
To enable us to focus on public sector performance measurement, the market is treated
as a passive player. It is assumed that private sector task outcomes cannot be hidden from the
worker or outsiders (for instance due to proﬁt signals from a marketed good). If the worker
8Wilson (1989) devotes an entire chapter to the constraints US government agencies face when acquiring
and disposing of factors of production and notes that “improving service... may require replacing slow or surly
w o r k e r sw i t hq u i c ka n dp l e a s a n to n e s .But the manager can neither hire nor ﬁre them at will” (p. 135).
7spent period 1 in the private sector, all players will have observed y1 by the start of period 2.
It is also assumed that the market cannot write contingent contracts, but instead makes oﬀers
as set out in Assumption 3.
A3 Private sector pay in period t is given by wmt(Ht)=P r ( yt = s | Ht)=P r ( θh | Ht) · θh +
Pr(θl | Ht) · θl, where Ht is the worker’s observable history prior to period t.
The market’s period t oﬀer is equal to its conditional expectation of the worker’s period
t productivity. To ease notation the wage wm1 will be written as w0,w m2(y1 = s)a sw(s), and
wm2(y1 = f)a sw(f).9 The prohibition on contingent contracts will be relaxed in Section 5.3
where we also consider the possibility that the worker, but not the market, observes y1.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows.
Period 0. Nature chooses the worker’s ability θ. Pg c o m m i t st oa( P M ,w) pair to maximize total
expected public sector proﬁt.
Period t =1 ,2.
Stage 1 The worker is oﬀered wgt and wmt.
Stage 2 The worker makes a sector choice ct ∈ {g,m} to maximize expected utility and is
paid wgt or wmt. The task outcome yt ∈ {s,f} is realized. If ct = m, all players
observe yt;i fct = g, yt is measured and published in accordance with the PM policy.
Our interest lies in solving for the optimal (PM, w) pair as a function of the exogenous
parameters of the model α, γ and θh. Since the worker moves without private information we
solve for the sub-game perfect equilibrium by backwards induction. Before doing so, however,
we brieﬂy return to three of our modelling choices.
The set of PM policies. In our benchmark model we abstract from situations where y1 is
observed by insiders but not outsiders. The situation where Pg (but not the market) observes
y1 is identical to opaqueness simply because her only strategic move is in period 0. In the
benchmark model, a worker who knows he was unsuccessful in period 1 will ﬁnd the market’s
period 2 oﬀer as attractive as a worker who knows he was successful. Since this prevents the
market from screening, the situation where the worker (but not the market) observes y1 is also
identical to opaqueness. We are, of course, implicitly assuming that Pg can prevent the worker
from observing y1. The possibility that the worker observes y1 by default is discussed in the
context of “craft” organizations in Section 6.
Exogenous pay compression.W et a k eγ to be exogenous for simplicity but also because,
lacking any empirical evidence, we are agnostic about the root cause of the pay compression
9Given our assumption that θh =1−θl and applying Bayes’ Rule, these wages are w(s)=1−2(θh −1)θh >
w0 =
1
2 >w (f)=2 ( θh − 1)θh.
8described in Section 2. It is possible to micro-found pay inﬂexibility by re-specifying Pg’s
objective function as an isoelastic social welfare function with an inequality aversion parameter
and/or including a concern for political support from labor groups that increases with γ.
Teams. There is no conceptual problem in aggregating the analysis up to team level; the
same trade oﬀs exist irrespective of whether the decision is to collect and publish a noisy team-
based statistic or a more informative individual-based PM. A thornier issue is that diﬀerent
PM systems may be used at diﬀerent tiers of the same organization. For instance, Wilson et
al (2004) report that UK head teachers engage in extensive internal performance measurement
in addition to publishing organization level PMs. We conjecture that this is a sub-optimal
arrangement (as we show in Section 5, internal PMs inhibit both recruitment and retention)
but leave a thorough analysis of multi-dimensional PM systems to future research.
4A n a l y s i s
To clarify the role played by pay rigidity, we ﬁrst present a Lemma that describes the equi-
librium when public sector pay is fully responsive to outside oﬀers (γ = 0) and, as result, Pg
chooses whether to enter the labor market rather than w.
Lemma 1. Assume A1-A3 but that γ =0 . If the worker is pre-disposed to the private sector
(α<0) Pg withdraws from the labor market, otherwise she recruits and retains with certainty
and makes a total expected proﬁto f 2α under any PM policy.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix B. The intuition is the following. PM systems
have no impact because, in expectation, Pg does not transfer any rent to the worker. To see
why this is the case, it is helpful to distinguish between three diﬀerent ‘types’ of worker: the
worker yet to complete a task (A0), the worker whose period 1 task was a success (As)a n d
the worker whose period 1 task was a failure (Af). When Pg adopts a policy of transparency
the market’s period 2 oﬀer depends on the worker’s initial performance but not on his sector
choice. A0 therefore knows that his sector choice has no bearing on his future payoﬀ and so
chooses between sectors on the basis of his current oﬀers. Consequently, Pg h i r e sa l lt y p e s-
including Af - at a wage equal to their future productivity less their intrinsic motivation and
so makes a total expected proﬁto f2 α.10
Under a policy of opaqueness, however, the market’s period 2 oﬀer depends on the
worker’s period 1 sector choice. If A0 goes private opaqueness obviously has no bite, but
if he goes public, the market oﬀers w0 to both As and Af. A0 therefore anticipates that going
private rather than public results in a higher wage in period 2 if he is successful, but that going
public rather than private results in a higher wage in period 2 if he fails. In the absence of
10H e r ea n di nw h a tf o l l o w sw es a yt h a tPG c a nh i r et h ew o r k e r‘ a t ’t h ew a g et h a tl e a v e sh i mi n d i ﬀerent
between sectors. Of course, she would need to oﬀer ε more than this wage to do so with certainty.
9pay rigidities, however, these eﬀects wash out, prompting A0 to choose a sector on the basis of
his current oﬀers. Now Pg hires A0 at w0 − α, As at less than w(s) − α and Af at more than
w(f)−α. Since the saving on As of w(s)−w0 and the rent paid to Af of w0 −w(f) cancel out
in expectation, Pg again makes a total expected proﬁto f2 α.11
Having shown that PM systems have no impact on the expected costs of recruitment and
retention when γ = 0, we now turn to the more interesting case where γ>0. To establish the
optimal PM policy in the presence of pay compression we need to know which, if any, (PM, w)
pair achieves each of the 8 hiring alternatives listed in Table 1 at the lowest cost.
Table 1: Hiring Alternatives under A1 and A2










Recruit Af from market
Retain only Af

















Recruit As from market











This is less tedious than it sounds as the last four alternatives are not feasible for any
(PM, w) pair. Consider Alternatives iv and v. In the presence of pay compression (A1), setting
w high enough to recruit As simply prompts A0 to go public in the ﬁrst place. Now consider
Alternatives vi and vii. If w is high enough to recruit A0,t h e nAf will wish to stay put (by
A 1 )a n ds om u s tb er e t a i n e d( b yA 2 ) . T h i sl e a v e su sw i t ht h eﬁrst four alternatives. Since
Alternatives 0 and i can be achieved at the same cost under any PM policy (because there is
no public sector performance to measure), all that remains is to establish which (PM, w)p a i r
minimizes the expected cost of Alternatives ii and iii.
When Pg adopts a policy of transparency the market always oﬀers w(y1)i np e r i o d2 .
This implies that the worker will go public in period 2 if and only if wg2 +α ≥ w(y1). His date
zero expected utility from going public in period 1 under a policy of transparency is therefore




Pr(y1)max{γ (w + α)+( 1− γ)w(y1),w(y1)},
11We deﬁne rent as any payment in excess of the worker’s true expected productivity less his intrinsic moti-
vation. For instance, for Af this is any payment above w(f) − α.
10while his date zero expected utility from going private in period 1 under any PM policy is
E[U(c1 = m,.)] = w0 +
P
y1∈{s,f}
Pr(y1)max{γ (w + α)+( 1− γ)w(y1),w(y1)}. (2)
Equation (1) is equal to (2) when w = w0 −α. Echoing the case where γ =0 ,P g can therefore
recruit A0 at a wage of w0 − α but, having published y1, will only be able to retain As at the
higher wage of w(s) − α.T h ek e yd i ﬀerence, of course, is that Af now receives some rent.
Recall that when Pg adopts a policy of opaqueness the market’s period 2 oﬀers depends
on the worker’s sector choice. If the worker goes private in period 1, the PM policy has no
bite but, if he goes public, his outside oﬀer remains at w0. Being opaque therefore saves Pg the
e x p e n s eo fh a v i n gt oo ﬀer w(s) − α to retain As. The downside is that, anticipating a lower
reward for public sector success, the worker will require more compensation to go public in
period 1. To see why, note that the worker’s date zero expected utility from going public in
period 1 under a policy of opaqueness is now given by
E[U(c1 = g,O)] = γ (w + α)+( 1− γ)w0 +m a x {γ (w + α)+( 1− γ)w0,w 0}. (3)





⇒ w∗ − w0 =
Pr(s)
1+Pr(s) [w(s) − w0]( 5 )
⇔ w(s) − w∗ = 1
1+Pr(s) [w(s) − w0]. (6)
Opaqueness therefore diﬀers from transparency in two respects. On the one hand, it
makes it harder to recruit by creating an option value to going private. Suppose that Pg sets
w = w0 − α. If the worker goes public in period 1 his expected utility in period 2 is w0.
However, he knows that if he goes private and fails he will receive γw0 +( 1− γ)w(f)i nt h e
public sector in period 2 but that if he succeeds he can exercise his option to stay in the private
sector and earn w(s). Going private therefore yields a higher expected period 2 wage and
Pg fails to recruit at w = w0 − α. The magnitude of this option-value eﬀect is given in (5).
Notice that the more likely the worker feels he is to succeed, the more likely this option is to
be exercised and hence the larger the compensation needed in public sector pay to convince
him to go public. On the other hand, since the worker is willing to go public in period 1 at
w∗−α<w (s)−α, opaqueness makes it easier to retain the worker if he is successful by driving
down his outside oﬀer. The magnitude of this outside-oﬀer eﬀect is given in (6).
The option-value and outside-oﬀer eﬀects are depicted by the solid and dashed arrows
in Figure 1. A move from left to right illustrates that Pg can achieve: Alternative 0 and i at
the same cost under any PM policy; Alternative ii by adopting a policy of transparency and
setting w = w0 − α; and Alternative iii (at least cost) by adopting a policy of opaqueness and
setting w = w∗ − α.
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Figure 1: The Option-value and Outside-oﬀer Eﬀects
Table 2: Comparing Feasible Hiring Alternatives
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Table 2 lists the total expected proﬁt associated with each alternative. Under Alternative
i Pg recruits Af and pays him his (true) expected productivity less his intrinsic motivation (i.e.
wg2 = γ (w(f) − α)+( 1− γ)(w(f) − α)=w(f) − α). Total expected proﬁt is therefore the
saving (or loss if α<0) made on Af arising from his intrinsic motivation. Under Alternative
ii A0 is paid her expected productivity less her intrinsic motivation but Af now receives a
rent of γ [w0 − w(f)]. Total expected proﬁt is therefore the saving/loss made on A0 and Af
arising from their intrinsic motivation less the rent paid to Af. Calculating the total expected
proﬁt under Alternative iii is more complicated as the option-value eﬀect implies that A0
is paid more than w0 − α, while the outside-oﬀer eﬀect implies that As is paid less than
w(s) − α. A pause for thought, however, conﬁrms that these eﬀects must wash out. Formally,
γ [w∗ − w0] ≡ Pr(s)γ [w(s) − w∗]. Consequently, total expected proﬁt is the saving/loss made
on A0, Af and As arising from their intrinsic motivation less the (now higher) rent paid to Af
of γ [w∗ − w(f)]. A comparison of these expected proﬁt levels yields our ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1. Assume A1-A3. There exists a critical value of the worker’s intrinsic moti-
vation, α∗(γ,θh) > 0, such that if α<α ∗ the choice of PM policy is arbitrary, while if α ≥ α∗
it is strictly optimal for Pg to abstain from performance measurement.
The proof of this ‘no transparency’ result,12 including an explicit expression for α∗(γ,θh),
12The statement ‘no transparency’ refers to the fact that transparency is not optimal whenever PG recruits
in period 1. A policy of transparency is, of course, weakly optimal for any α<α
∗ simply because there is no
public sector performance to measure.
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Figure 2: The Benchmark ‘No Transparency’ Result
is provided in Appendix B. The intuition is best seen in two steps. First, consider what happens
when α ≤ 0. If the worker is pre-disposed to the private sector Pg will withdraw from the labor
market, while if the worker has no intrinsic motivation she will recruit Af from the private
sector in period 2. In both cases there is no public sector performance to measure and so
the PM policy is arbitrary. Now suppose that α is suﬃciently high such that Pg is willing
to recruit in period 1. Is it optimal to stop there or will Pg strive to recruit and retain with
certainty? There are two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, retaining with certainty transfers
more rent to Af -t h erent eﬀect. On the other, Pg beneﬁts from As’s intrinsic motivation - the
motivation eﬀect. In the benchmark model the motivation eﬀect always dominates. In short,
if α is suﬃciently high to prompt Pg to recruit in period 1, it is optimal for her to set w al i t t l e
higher to retain with certainty.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of Proposition 1. The key point to note is that there is
no region where it is optimal to pick Alternative ii. To ﬁx this idea, consider a vertical slice
through Figure 2, panel (a) with θh =0 .65. If the worker is pre-disposed to private sector
employment (α<0) then it is not optimal for Pg to hire in any period (Alternative 0). As
the worker’s antipathy towards the public sector decreases it will eventually become optimal to
recruit in period 2 (Alternative i). This switch occurs at α = 0. As the worker starts to display
public service motivation (α>0) it will eventually become optimal to switch to recruiting and
retaining with certainty (Alternative iii). This second switch occurs at α∗(γ,0.65) = 0.02. The
function α∗ is increasing in γ and θh because both parameters entail a greater transfer of rent
to Af under Alternative iii.
135 Alternative Personnel Policies
The ﬁnding that it is never optimal for Pg to commit to a policy of transparency is obviously
a stark result. In this Section we explore whether this benchmark ‘no transparency’ result
is robust to alternative personnel policies commonly found in the public and private sectors.
The consequences of extending the model to more than two periods and levels of output are
discussed in Section 6.
5.1 Service Based Pay in the Public Sector
Pay schemes that reward a worker’s length of service are common place in the public sector (see,
e.g., OECD 2002). In this Subsection we establish the optimal PM policy when Pg commits
to supplement w by an amount b>0 after one period of service. Formally, the model is the
same as in Section 4 save for the fact that A1 is now replaced by:
A10 Public sector pay is determined by the formula
wg1 = γw +( 1− γ)(wm1 − α)
wg2 =
(
γ (w + b)+( 1− γ)(wm2 − α)i fc1 = g
γw +( 1− γ)(wm2 − α)i fc1 = m.
Although we will ultimately allow Pg to choose b alongside the (PM, w) pair at the beginning
of the game, we ﬁrst consider the case where b is exogenously set below 2[w0 − w(f)]. Doing
so clariﬁes the intuition and, moreover, may be descriptive in settings where service bonuses
are determined by negotiation between central government and unions.
If the worker goes private in period 1 the service bonus and PM policy have no bite and
the worker’s date zero expected utility from going private in period 1 is given in (2). Things
change, however, when the worker goes public in period 1. Under a policy of transparency he
will go public in period 2 if and only if wg2 + α ≥ w(y1) and so his date zero expected utility
from going public in period 1 is




Pr(y1)max{γ (w + α + b)+( 1− γ)w(y1),w(y1)}.
Under a policy opaqueness, he will go public in period 2 if and only if wg2 +α ≥ w0 and so his
date zero expected utility from going public in period 1 is
E[U(c1 = g),O]=γ (w + α)+( 1− γ)w0 +m a x {γ (w + α + b)+( 1− γ)w0,w 0}. (8)
Equation (7) is equal to (2) when w = w0 − α − Pr(f)b, while equation (8) is equal to (2) at
w = w∗ − α − b
1+Pr(s), where w∗ i sg i v e ni n( 4 ) .
14Just as in Section 4, a policy of opaqueness makes it harder to recruit A0 by creating an
option value to going private but easier to retain As by driving down his outside oﬀer. Table
3 lists the total expected proﬁt associated with each of the four feasible hiring alternatives.
Table 3: Comparing Feasible Hiring Alternatives (‘low’ service bonus)
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[1 + Pr(f)]α − Pr(f)γ [w0 − w(f) − Pr(f)b]
2α − Pr(f)γ
h
w∗ − w(f) − b
1+Pr(s)
i
Note that the expected return to Alternative ii and iii is higher than in Table 2 because
the service bonus reduces the rent paid to Af. To see why, consider Alternative ii. Pg can
recruit A0 on a lower wage because he expects to receive the service bonus in period 2 if he fails
in period 1. Of course, this saving on A0 is oﬀset (in expectation) by the fact that Pg then has
to pay b to Af. Crucially, however, w is lower and so Pg transfers less rent to Af.N o t i c et h a ti f
Pg chooses Alternative iii she can recruit A0 on an even lower wage as he now expects to receive
the service bonus with certainty. Formally, b/[1 + Pr(s)] > Pr(f)b. This latter observation
implies that the service bonus reduces the magnitude of the option-value eﬀect and, in turn,
Pg’s transfer of rent to Af under Alternative iii. In fact, as b approaches 2[w0 − w(f)] the
option-value eﬀect disappears and Pg transfers the same rent under Alternatives iii and ii. A
comparison of the expected proﬁt levels listed in Table 3 establishes the optimal PM policy
when b<2[w0 − w(f)].
Proposition 2. Assume A10, A2, A3 and that the service bonus is low (0 <b<2[w0 − w(f)]).
There exists a critical value of the worker’s intrinsic motivation,0<α 0(γ,θh,b) <α ∗(γ,θh),
such that if α ≤ α0 the choice of PM policy is arbitrary, while if α>α 0 it is strictly optimal
for Pg to abstain from performance measurement.
A low service bonus preserves our benchmark result: transparency is dominated whenever
Pg recruits in period 1 and so has performance to measure. The intuition is simple and follows
from the rent and motivation eﬀects discussed in Section 4. Speciﬁcally, a positive service
bonus reduces the rent eﬀect. Since the motivation eﬀect is unchanged, Proposition 1 therefore
implies that it cannot be optimal for Pg to choose Alternative ii. The critical value is lower
(α0 <α ∗) because less rent is transferred to Af under Alternative iii.
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 imply that a policy of transparency is dominated
whenever the service bonus is suﬃciently low. Since it remains of interest to establish what
15level of bonus Pg would commit to if free to do so, we conclude this Subsection by considering
t h ec a s ew h e r eb ≥ 2[w0 − w(f)].
A commitment to pay a ‘high’ service bonus has two eﬀects. First, under a policy of
transparency, Pg can retain As at a wage below that needed to recruit Af from the market,
namely at w = w(s)−α−b<w (f)−α. Second, it enables Pg to recruit A0 at the same wage
under both transparency and opaqueness. In short, a high bonus removes both the option-
value and outside-oﬀer eﬀects. Pg therefore faces just two feasible hiring alternatives: she can
withdraw from the labour market or she can recruit and retain with certainty by adopting
either a policy of transparency or opaqueness and setting w = w0 − α − b
2.
Table 4: Comparing Feasible Hiring Alternatives (‘high’ service bonus)










A comparison of the total expected proﬁtl e v e l si nT a b l e s2 - 4y i e l d st h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .
Proposition 3. Assume A10,A 2a n dA 3 .I f α<0 the choice of PM policy is arbitrary, while
if α ≥ 0 it is strictly optimal for Pg to commit to a service bonus b ≥ 2[w0 − w(f)] and weakly
optimal for her to abstain from performance measurement.
There are two points to take away from Proposition 3. First, service based pay can be
rationalized as an optimal response to exogenous compression in public sector pay. Setting a
‘high’ bonus enables Pg to achieve a payoﬀ of 2α which, from Lemma 1, is the same pay-oﬀ
that she could achieve in the absence of pay compression . Second, if Pg is free to commit to
such a bonus, it is now only weakly optimal to abstain from performance measurement.
5.2 A Port of Entry in the Public Sector
Personnel policies restricting entry to certain grades/ages are also common in the public sector,
particularly within the civil service.13 In this Section we show that our ‘no transparency’ result
persists in the presence of such a ‘port of entry’.14 Formally, the model is the same as in Section
4 save for the fact that we replace A2 with
A20 The worker cannot be ﬁred but can only enter the public sector in period 1.
13Ports of entry are clearly apparent in the data reported in OECD (1999). In 1997 the ratio of the percentage
of entrants to serving staﬀ in the UK Civil Service was more than 5 times higher for the 16-24 age bracket than
for any other age group. A similar pattern was true for Australia (the only other country for which age at entry
data was available).
14A similar result holds if PG commits to deny entry to Af but not As.
16Since going private in period 1 necessarily implies staying in the private sector in period
2, the worker’s date zero expected utility from going private in period 1 is, under any PM
policy,




When the worker goes public in period 1 the analysis is the same as in Section 4. Date zero
expected utilities from going public in period 1 under a policy of transparency and opaqueness






⇒ w0 − wpe =
Pr(f)
1+Pr(f) [w0 − w(f)]. (11)
Equation (3) is equal to (9) when w = w0 − α.
In the presence of a port of entry, a policy of transparency creates an option value to
going public (the magnitude in (11)). The logic mirrors that in Section 4. The more likely the
worker feels he is to fail, the more likely he is to exercise his option to stay in the public sector
and hence the larger the amount by which Pg can undercut the market oﬀer of w0. Opaqueness
therefore diﬀers from transparency in two respects. On the one hand, it makes it harder to
recruit by removing an option-value to going public (rather than by creating an option-value
to going private). On the other hand, since the worker is willing to go public in period 1 at
w0 − α<w (s) − α, it makes it easier to retain the worker if he is successful by driving down
his outside oﬀer. When operating a port of entry, Pg can therefore achieve: Alternative 0 at
the same cost under any PM policy; Alternative ii by adopting a policy of transparency and
setting w = wpe −α; and Alternative iii (at least cost) by adopting a policy of opaqueness and
setting w = w0 − α.
Table 5: Comparing Feasible Hiring Alternatives (with a port of entry)













Table 5 lists the total expected proﬁt levels associated with each of the three feasible al-
ternatives. Now all rent is oﬀset in expectation. If Pg chooses Alternative ii the rent transferred
to Af is oﬀset by the saving on A0. Likewise if she chooses Alternative iii the rent transferred






pe − w(f)] and
Pr(s)[w(s) − w0] ≡ Pr(f)[w0 − w(f)]. A comparison of the total expected proﬁt levels in
Tables 2 and 5 yields the following result.
17Proposition 4. Assume A1, A20 and A3. If α<0 the choice of PM policy is arbitrary, while
if α ≥ 0 it is strictly optimal for Pg to operate a port of entry and to abstain from performance
measurement.
The operation of a port of entry preserves our benchmark ‘no transparency’ result and
can also be rationalized as an optimal response to exogenous compression in public sector pay.
Again, the intuition is simple and follows from the rent and motivation eﬀects. By committing
not to recruit in period 2, Pg removes the rent eﬀect. As a result, whenever she enters the labor
market, it is optimal for her to choose Alternative iii, and hence a policy of opaqueness, to
maximize the motivation eﬀect. The critical value is now at zero because no rent is transferred
to Af under Alternative iii.
5.3 Performance Based Pay in the Private Sector
If pay is often based on length of service in the public sector, in the private sector it is common
to ﬁnd it explicitly linked to performance. In this Subsection we establish the optimal PM
policy when the market oﬀers a performance contingent bonus. Formally, the model is the
same as in Section 4 save for the fact that we set γ = 1 and replace A3 with
A30 At the start of period t the market oﬀers a contract that pays a strictly positive base wage
wt plus a bonus βt iﬀ yt = s. This contract breaks even in expectation implying that
wt =( 1− βt)Pr(yt = s | Ht).
The requirement that the market’s contract break even in expectation has two conse-
quences. First, it implies that βt acts a parameter that determines the sensitivity of the
worker’s pay to his performance. When βt = 1 the worker is paid the value of his period t
output; as βt approaches 0 his period t pay is independent of his period t output (as in Section
4). Second, for any βt < 1, the worker’s period t pay is increasing in the market’s belief that
he is likely to succeed in period t. Notice that a worker who knows he was successful in period
1w i l ln o wﬁnd any given contract <wt,βt> more attractive than a worker who knows he was
unsuccessful. Since this raises the possibility of the market screening for y1,w en o wa d dat h i r d
PM policy to those discussed in Section 4. In addition to adopting a policy of transparency
or opaqueness, Pg can now also commit to introduce an internal PM (the worker but not the
market observes y1).
The presence of performance pay in the market has no impact on Pg’s ability to hire
under transparency or opaqueness. Under a policy of transparency, date zero expected utilities
are given in (1) and (2) and so the worker goes public in period 1 if and only if w ≥ w0 − α.15
15Under a policy of transparency the worker’s expected income from going private in period t is wmt(Ht)=
Pr(y2 = s | Ht). That is, a base wage of (1 − βt)Pr(y2 = t | Ht)p l u sab o n u so fβt with probability Pr(y2 = s |
Ht).
18Under a policy of opaqueness, date zero expected utilities are given in (2) and (3), implying
that the worker will go public in period 1 if and only if w ≥ w∗ − α. Things change, however,
when Pg introduces an internal PM. If the worker spent period 1 in the private sector this PM
policy has no bite but, if he spent period 1 in the public sector, the market will anticipate
that its contract is more likely to be accepted by As than Af. In the latter case the (perfect
Bayesian) sub-game equilibria are as stated in Lemma 1.16
Lemma 2. Assume A1, A2, A30 and that the worker goes public in period 1. If Pg introduces
an internal PM, she retains an unsuccessful worker (Af) with positive probability iﬀ w>w0 =
(1−β2)w0+β2w(f)−α and certainty iﬀ w ≥ w00 =( 1−β2)w(s)+β2w(f)−α,a n das u c c e s s f u l
worker (As)i ﬀ w ≥ w(s) − α.
An internal PM increases the cost of retaining As by driving up both components of the
market’s outside oﬀer. As’s expected bonus increases because, having learnt he was successful
in period 1, he is now more conﬁdent of success in period 2. His base wage increases because,
for any w>w0, there is now favorable selection into the labor market.
When public sector pay is low (w<w0) the market anticipates that performance related
pay will be attractive to Af as well as As. This inference keeps the base wage at (1 − β2)w0.
Since the returns to public sector employment (w + α)a r es m a l l e rt h a nAf’s base wage and
expected bonus, the unique sub-game equilibrium has both types going private. When public
sector pay is higher (w ≥ w0) the market anticipates that Af will go public with positive
probability. The inference that the market is more likely to hire As than Af therefore drives
the base wage upwards towards (1 − β2)w(s). For any w0 ≤ w<w00, the returns to public
sector employment equate with Af’s expected income in period 2 and the unique equilibrium
is semi-separating. As w increases above w00 Af, and eventually As, goes public.
Clearly, an internal PM cannot achieve Alternative iii at least cost. To see whether the
same is true for Alternative ii we must turn to the worker’s period 1 problem. Let σ denote the
probability that the worker goes public in period 2 having failed in the public sector in period
1a n dP r ( y2 = s | c1 = g,σ) the market’s belief that a worker it recruits from the public sector
will succeed in period 2 when Af plays σ.17 Then, for any w ∈ [w0,w00], the worker’s date zero
expected utility from going public in period 1 under an internal PM is
E[U(c1 = g,I)] = w+α+Pr(s)[(1− β2)Pr(y2 = s | c1 = g,σ)+β2w(s)]+Pr(f)[w + α], (12)
while his date zero expected utility from going private in period 1 under an internal PM is
E[U(c1 = m,I)] = w0 +P r ( s)[(1− β2)Pr(y2 = s | y1 = s)+β2w(s)] + Pr(f)[w + α]. (13)
16To remove the possibility of multiple sub-game equilibria when both As and Af go public, we assume that
the market attributes oﬀ equilibrium moves to As (the type with the greater incentive to deviate).
17Explicit formulae for σ and Pr(y2 = s | c1 = g,σ)a r eg i v e ni nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a2i nt h eA p p e n d i x .
19Equation (12) is equal to (13) at w = wprp − α,w h e r e
wprp =
(
w∗ − ∆ for any β2 < 1
2
w0 for any β2 ≥ 1
2
. (14)
The term ∆ is increasing in β2 and is deﬁned in proof of Proposition 5 in Appendix B, while
w∗ i sg i v e ni n( 4 ) .
For β2 close to zero the option-value eﬀect is the same as in Section 4 (i.e. ∆ =0 ) ,w h i l e
for any β2 ≤ 1
2 the option-value eﬀe c td i s a p p e a r s .T os e ew h yt h i si st h ec a s e ,s u p p o s et h a tPg
sets w = w0 −α when β2 is low. Since Af will quit the public sector with positive probability,
the market keeps its period 2 base wage below w(s) and so going private in period 1 has an
option value. If β2 is high, however, Af will stay put. Since this drives the market’s oﬀer to As
up to w(s), going private in period 1 no longer yields any advantage enabling Pg to undercut
the market’s entry oﬀer w0 by α.
When the degree of performance pay in the market is suﬃciently high (β2 ≥ 1
2), the
introduction of an internal PM has exactly the same impact on recruitment and retention
as a policy of transparency and so, applying Proposition 1, this cannot be an optimal PM
policy. When performance pay is lower (β2 < 1
2) matters are more complicated as Pg faces an
additional hiring alterative. Speciﬁcally, if she sets w = w∗ −∆−α and introduces an internal
PM she can recruit A0 and then retain Af with probability σ<1 (what we will call Alternative
iia). A comparison of the expected costs and beneﬁts across all ﬁve feasible alternatives gives
us our ﬁnal result.
Proposition 5. Assume A1, A2 and A30. When the market ‘pays for performance’ (βt > 0)
it is never optimal for Pg to introduce an internal PM. If α<α ∗ the choice of PM policy is
arbitrary, while if α ≥ α∗ it is strictly optimal for her to abstain from performance measure-
ment.
Having already established that an internal PM is dominated when β2 ≥ 1
2, this result
simply conﬁrms that it is not optimal for Pg to pay a premium to to rid herself of an unsuccessful
worker when β2 < 1
2. True Alternative iia results in a lower expected wage bill than Alternative
ii as Pg only retains (and hence pays rent to) Af with positive probability. However, the option-
value eﬀect ensures that this cost saving is insuﬃcient to outweigh the saving made from Af’s
intrinsic motivation. Since this tells us that it is not optimal to introduce an internal PM for
any β2, the analysis in Section 4 continues to apply.18 Pg will either choose not to recruit in
period 1, in which case the PM policy is arbitrary, or she will recruit and retain with certainty
and hence abstain from performance measurement.
18Note that internal PMs can be beneﬁcial in settings where eﬀort is a determinant of output. Ederer (2004),
for instance, shows that tailoring of second period eﬀort to beliefs can improve sorting in internal ‘promotion’
touraments when the production function is multiplicative in talent and eﬀort.
206 Discussion
We begin our discussion by contemplating two further extensions that would take the model
a little closer to reality, namely more periods and levels of output. A three period version of
the benchmark model of Section 4 is analyzed in Albano and Leaver (2004). The analysis is
substantially more involved but yields qualitatively similar results. Internal PMs are strictly
dominated even in the absence of performance pay in the market because the extra period
enables the market to screen. Speciﬁcally, internal PMs reward public sector quitters and
scar public sector stayers thereby making it diﬃcult to recruit and retain. Similarly, while a
policy of transparency can be optimal, opaqueness dominates for almost all parameters. A
version of the model with three levels of output also yields qualitatively similar results.19 We
conjecture that the same is true for continuous output but leave analysis of such a model for
future research.
With these comments in mind, we now oﬀer a series of remarks that draw out the main
policy implications of the analysis in Sections 4 and 5.
Remark 1 Performance measurement systems aﬀect the cost of recruiting and retaining public
sector employees.
To some this statement may seem is self-evident; performance measurement, like all “red
tape”, aﬀects recruitment and retention because it demotivates employees. This may or may
n o tb et r u e .W ea r em a k i n gad i ﬀerent point however, namely that PM systems aﬀect the cost
of recruitment and retention due to rigidities in public sector pay.
In the absence of pay rigidities, recruitment costs are independent of the PM policy
because initial sector choices have no bearing on future income. As a result, the only choice a
public sector organization faces is how to retain a worker. It can be transparent retain with
certainty and pay no rent; or it can be opaque, retain with certainty and make a saving on good
performers that oﬀsets the rent paid to poor performers. Because no rent is paid in expectation
retention costs are also independent of the PM policy.
In the presence of pay rigidities, the option-value eﬀect ensures that recruitment costs
vary across PM policies. Likewise, the outside-oﬀer eﬀect ensures that retention costs vary
across PM policies because any extra pay to good performers now transfers rent to poor per-
formers. Crucially, it is no longer possible to be transparent, retain with certainty and pay no
rent. The upshot is that a public sector organization faces a recruitment-retention trade oﬀ.I t
can be transparent, recruit cheaply but see its best employees leave or be opaque, recruit at a
higher cost and (providing the market cannot screen) see its best employees stay. This trade oﬀ
implies that the public sector should pay heed to recruitment and retention considerations, and
not just incentives and accountability, when attempting to measure and manage performance.
19Available as an Appendix upon request.
21Remark 1 raises two questions. Can we say how the recruitment-retention trade-oﬀ should
be resolved when only recruitment and retention considerations matter? And what happens
when workers are aware of their achievements even in the absence of formal performance mon-
itoring by managers? Our next remark answers these questions by drawing on a typology of
organizations used in the public administration literature.
Wilson (1989, Ch. 9) suggests that, from a managerial point of view, government agencies
diﬀer along two dimensions. Whether managers can observe the outputs of their operators, i.e.
“what teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, police oﬃcers, and grant-givers do on a day-to-day
basis”. And whether managers or operators can observe outcomes, i.e. “how, if at all, the
world changes because of the outputs”. The interesting case for our purposes is what Wilson
terms a “craft” organization, where outcomes but not outputs are observable. A good example
of such an organization is the Anti-Trust division of the Department of Justice: outcomes are
readily observable as cases are either won or lost, but outputs (case initiation and preparation
by lawyers and economists) are esoteric and are not. Since workers in a craft organization can
observe both outputs and outcomes, they are likely to have a considerably better idea of their
own performance (and hence future productivity) than their managers, even in an absence of
formal PM systems.20 Deﬁning a “craft” organization as one where the worker observes y1
even when Pg abstains from performance measurement, we have our second remark.
Remark 2 Recruitment and retention considerations are likely to be best served by the intro-
duction and publication of formal PMs in “craft” organizations but otherwise by abstention
from performance measurement.
The analysis of Section 4 and 5 can be applied to craft organizations simply by recognizing
that abstaining from performance measurement is now equivalent to internal PM. If there is no
p e r f o r m a n c ep a yi nt h em a r k e tand the worker can only complete two tasks, it is still optimal for
managers abstain from performance measurement. The market’s inability to screen preserves
the outside-oﬀer eﬀect, ensuring that the motivation eﬀect dominates. In most real world
settings, however, the market will infer that it is the most able who quit the public sector. In
this case, recruitment and retention considerations will be best served by an active policy of
transparency as this makes it cheaper to recruit and, given the market’s ability to screen, has
no adverse consequences for retention.
In other organizations, however, (i.e. those in which workers ﬁnd it hard to judge their
performance in the absence of formal PMs) Propositions 1-5 apply directly. The recruitment-
retention trade oﬀ should be resolved in favour of retention, dictating an abstention from
20Contrast this situation with that of a “coping” agency such as a school (Wilson 1989, p. 168-170) where
managers will ﬁnd it hard to observe outputs (as they take place in classrooms out of view) and outcomes are
hard to deﬁne / measure. Absent formal PMs such as SATs, teachers will know how well they have prepared
but not how well they have performed.
22performance measurement. To the extent that publishing performance fosters eﬀort via, say,
career concerns, this suggests that a balance may need to be struck between selection and
incentives.
A caveat to the above discussion is that the recruitment-retention trade-oﬀ need not
always exist. If employers pay a suﬃciently high service bonus, it is possible to recruit and
retain at the same cost under either PM policy. This observation brings us to our ﬁnal remark.
Remark 3 Service based pay and ports of entry can be rationalized as an optimal response to
rigidities in public sector pay.
Enthusiasm for traditional public sector personnel policies such as service based pay
and ports of entry appears to be waning. In the UK Civil Service, for instance, senior posts
were historically only accessible via promotion from the graduate Fast Stream, while pay and
promotion were both service based.21 Today, senior posts can be ﬁlled by “experienced pro-
fessionals” from the private sector (30% of the intake in 2004) and annual pay increases are
performance-related.22 Our results sound a note of caution: policy-makers should think twice
before removing service bonuses and ports of entry, particularly if the objective is to improve
recruitment and retention. Both policies mitigate the transfer of rent to poor performers (at
least in expectation) and are therefore an optimal response to exogenous rigidities in public
sector pay.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Governments have already begun to appreciate that incentive schemes can have perverse eﬀects
in public sector organizations. This paper points out that performance measurement may also
have unexpected consequences.
Our ﬁndings suggests a number of directions for future research. Since performance
measurement aﬀects recruitment and retention through the existence of pay inﬂexibility it
seems crucial to understand whether such rigidity is driven by top-down political forces or
bottom-up organizational / labor market structures. Since some degree of pay inﬂexibility is
likely to be here to stay, it would also be desirable to identify how far recruitment and retention
considerations - via ` av i sincentives - should shape policy. One possibility would be to test
the predictions of the model in relation to hazard rates. According to our model, public sector
stayers in opaque organizations become scarred by the market and so, having failed to exit early
on, ﬁnd it less and less attractive to quit. If this force is important we should observe, not only
21Commenting on the pattern of promotions to the Senior Civil Service within the Government Economics
Service over the period 1978-1999, the Performance Innovation Unit (2000) notes “this pattern of promotion can
send out undesirable signals to those currently within the GES. It may create the perception that promotion
within the GES is based on length of tenure rather than merit.”
22Source: the Civil Service Recruitment Gateway at www.careers.civil-service.gov.uk.
23that hazard rates decline with tenure (as is well known), but that they do so most steeply in
opaque organizations characterized by a high degree of pay inﬂexibility. On a more theoretical
note, the current debate concerning the use of non-consolidated bonuses in government agencies
suggests that it would be interesting to explore the consequences of publishing performance
when a fraction of public sector pay is linked to an explicit incentive scheme.
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A Evidence of Relative Pay Compression
3.1 2.8 3.0 2.7 UK (Disney & Gosling 1998, 
BHPS 1991-95,  weekly wage ratio)
1.3 1.0 1.1 0.9 Germany (Melly 2003,
GSOEP 2000, log hourly wage spread)
1.5 1.3 1.7 1.3 US (Borjas 2002,
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LCMS 1996,  wage ratio)
Public
Women Men
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5.5 Zambia (Nielsen & Rosholm 2001, 
LCMS 1996,  wage ratio)
Public
Women Men
Table A1: 90-10 Percentile Wage Gap by Gender and Sector
12, 0 20, -13 25, 7 0, 0 0, -20 10, -5 UK (Disney & Gosling 1998, 
BHPS 1991-95, log weekly wage)3
- - 22, -7 - - 10, -5 Canada (Mueller 1998, 
LMAS 1990, log hourly wage)1
50, -6 -50, -10 22, -8 14, 0 -8, -30 7, -20 Germany (Melly 2003,
GSOEP 2000, log hourly wage )2
7, 0 26, -14 9, -4 0, -13 12, -20 7, -8 US (Poterba & Rueben 1994,
CPS 1991, log hourly wage)4
Notes: 
Non-zero estimates were reported as statistically different from zero at 5% or below.
Mueller (1998) and Melly (2003) combine Oaxaca decomposition with quantile regression. The remaining studies use only quantile
regression analysis and hence constrain the returns to observable characteristics to be equal across sectors.
1. Covariates include: education, province, marital status, age, mother tongue, union status, job-related pension, visible minority, disability, 
immigrant, occupation.
2. Covariates: experience, job tenure, marital status, part-time status, education and occupation. High = university, low = basic or 
intermediate schooling with no training
3. Covariates: age quadratics, year dummies. High = degree, low = normal formal qualification. 
4. Covariates: experience, marital status, SMSA status, race. High = > 16 yrs, low = < 12 yrs. 
5. ‘All’ does not condition on  gender and age. Covariates in other columns: gender, age, marital status, rural and province dummies. High 
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27BP r o o f s
Proof of Lemma 1. When γ =0 ,P g chooses whether to enter the labor market and, if she
does, what PM policy to employ. We ﬁrst derive her expected proﬁt under each PM policy
conditional on entry and then show when she will enter. Suppose that she enters and chooses a
policy of transparency. The market oﬀers w0 to A0, and, irrespective of where A0 spent period
1, w(s)t oAs and w(f)t oAf. From A1, Pg commits to undercut every market oﬀer by α,
implying that the worker’s date zero expected utility from going public or private in period 1
under a policy of transparency is
E[U(c1 = g,T)] = E[U(c1 = m,T)] = w0 +P r ( y1 = s)w(s)+P r ( y1 = f)w(f). (15)
Pg therefore recruits A0 at w0 − α and retains As at w(s) − α and Af at w(f) − α,m a k i n ga
total expected proﬁto f
Pr(y1 = s) − (w0 − α)+
P
y1∈{s,f}
{Pr(y2 = s | y1) − (w(y1) − α)} =2 α. (16)
Now suppose that she enters and chooses a policy of opaqueness. The market again oﬀers w0
to A0. If he goes private it then oﬀers w(s)t oAs and w(f)t oAf, while if he goes public it
oﬀers both types w0. The worker’s date zero expected utility from going public in period 1
under a policy of opaqueness is now,
E[U(c1 = g,O)] = w0 + w0 (17)
while his date zero expected utility from going private in period 1 under a policy of opaqueness
is equal to the expression given in (15). Notice that, by the Law of Total Probability, (15) is
equal to (17). Pg therefore recruits A0 at w0 − α and retains As both Af at w0 − α,m a k i n ga
total expected proﬁto f
Pr(y1 = s) − (w0 − α)+P r ( y2 = s) − (w0 − α)=2 α. (18)
It obviously follows from (16) and (18) that Pg’s expected proﬁts are independent of the PM
policy and that she will enter whenever α ≥ 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ti ti sn o to p t i m a lf o rPg to choose
Alternative ii for any α. Suppose that it is. From Table 2, for Pg to choose Alternative ii over
iw er e q u i r e
α ≥ Pr(f)γ [w0 − w(f)], (19)
while for Pg to choose Alternative iii and ii we require
α<
Pr(f)
Pr(s)γ [w∗ − w0]. (20)
28It follows from the deﬁnition of w∗ in (4) that
[w∗ − w0] ≡
Pr(f)
1+Pr(s) [w0 − w(f)], (21)
implying that we require
γ [w0 − w(f)] <α<
Pr(f)
Pr(s)[1+Pr(s)]γ [w0 − w(f)]. (22)
So, given
Pr(f)
Pr(s)[1+Pr(s)] < 1, we have a contradiction. Accordingly, there cannot exist a value of
α such that it is optimal to choose Alternative ii.
We complete the proof by deriving α∗. Since α∗ is the level of intrinsic motivation that
leaves Pg indiﬀerent between Alternatives i and iii, from Table 2 we must have




1+Pr(s)γ [w∗ − w(f)] = 2
9γ (2θh − 1)
2 . (24)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Subtracting the pay-oﬀ to Alternative ii from the payoﬀ to
Alternative iii in Table 3 gives





− Pr(f)γ [w∗ − w0], (25)
which, given 1
1+Pr(s) > Pr(f), is increasing in b. It therefore follows immediately from Propo-
sition 1 that it cannot be optimal for Pg to choose Alternative ii for any α.
We complete the proof by deriving α0. Since α0 is the level of public service motivation
that leaves Pg indiﬀerent between Alternatives i and iii, from Table 3 we must have
2α0 − Pr(f)γ
h
w∗ − w(f) − b
1+Pr(s)
i
















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Immediate from γ>0 and Tables 2-4.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Immediate from Table 5.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . We ﬁrst show that Pg cannot retain Af for any w<w0. Suppose
that the market expects Af to go public with probability σ and As to go private. Using Bayes’
rule its base wage oﬀer is w2 =( 1− β2)Pr(y2 = s | c1 = g,σ), where
Pr(y2 = s | c1 = g,σ)= P r ( y2 = s | y1 = s) ·
Pr(s)
Pr(s)+Pr(f)(1−σ) (28)
+P r ( y2 = s | y1 = f) ·
Pr(f)(1−σ)
Pr(s)+Pr(f)(1−σ).
29For this to be equilibrium Af must be willing to go public with probability σ. However, his
expected utility from going public is
E[U(c2 = g)=w + α (29)
while his expected utility from going private is
E[U(c2 = m)=( 1− β2)Pr(y2 = s | c1 = g,σ)+β2w(f). (30)
So for any w<w0,w eh a v eE[U(c2 = m) >E [U(c2 = g)i m p l y i n gt h a tAf has an incentive to
deviate.
We now show that Pg can retain Af with positive probability for any w>w0 and certainty
for any w>w00.C l e a r l y Af will only play a mixed strategy when both sector choices yield
the same expected utility. Substituting for (28) in (30) and equating with (29) we obtain an
explicit expression for this mixed strategy
σ =
2(w + α) − 1+β2(2θh − 1)2
w + α +2 ( θh − 1)θh
. (31)
Using the fact that Pr(y2 = s | c1 = g,σ =0 )=w0 it is straightforward to show that
σ(w = w0,.) = 0. Similarly, using Pr(y2 = s | c1 = g,σ =1 )=w(s) it is straightforward to
show that σ(w = w00,.)=1 .
Finally, we show that Pg cannot retain As for any w<w (s) − α. Suppose that the
market expects As and Af to go public. Using our assumption that deviations are attributed
to As, the market’s base wage oﬀer is w2 =( 1− β2)Pr(y2 = s | y1 = s). For this to be an
equilibrium As must be willing to go public. His expected utility from going public is given in
(29) while his expected utility from going private is
E[U(c2 = m)=( 1− β2)Pr(y2 = s | y1 = s)+β2w(s)=w(s). (32)
So for any w<w (s) − α,w eh a v eE[U(c2 = m) >E [U(c2 = g)i m p l y i n gt h a tAs has an
incentive to deviate. Obviously, to complete the proof, we simply need to note that As has no
incentive deviate for any w ≥ w(s) − α.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Having already shown in the text that internal PMs are
dominated when β2 ≥ 1
2,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r eβ2 < 1
2 and ﬁrst show that Alternative ii
yields a higher pay-oﬀ to Alternative iia for any α>0.
To do so we need to derive an explicit expression for wprp and σ(wprp). It follows from
(12) and (13) that the term ∆ is given by
∆ =
Pr(s)
1+Pr(s) [w(s) − w0]+P r ( s)(1− β2)[Pr(y2 = s | c1 = g,σ) − w(s)]. (33)
Substituting for (31) in (28) and then for Pr(y2 = s | c1 = g,σ)i n( 3 3 )w eh a v e
wprp = w∗ −
Pr(s)


















Notice that wprp is decreasing in β2 on the interval [w0,w∗].P g can achieve Alternative iia at




The expected net beneﬁt of choosing Alternative iia is therefore








(wprp − α), (36)
while, from Table 2, the expected net beneﬁt of choosing Alternative ii is
Pr(s)+P r ( f,s) − [1 + Pr(f)](w0 − α). (37)
Subtracting (36) from (37) gives
Pr(f)
1−2β2
2−β2 [w(f)+α] − [1 + Pr(f)]w0 +
h





Setting α to zero and substituting for wprp, (38) simpliﬁes to
1
12 (1 − 2β2)(2θh − 1)
2 > 0,
w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tf o ra n yα>0 Pg will choose Alternative ii over iia. Since we already
know from Proposition 1 that Pg will choose either Alternative i or iii over ii this completes
the proof.
31